Not to disagree with Socrates…but I gotta disagree with Socrates
Plato, Republic, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881).
After announcing that the guard dog furnishes a great example for the guardian of the city, Socrates asks:
Would you not say that he should combine with the spirited nature the qualities of a philosopher? (p. 55)
Glaucon’s reaction is much like mine was: Umm…are you having a stroke, Socrates? What does a guard dog have to do with philosophy?
Socrates’ “reasoning” here is a bit difficult to follow because it sounds so weird to modern ears. Essentially, he notes that dogs will be friendly to people they know and aggressive toward strangers — even if the strangers have never done the dog any harm, and the familiars have never done the dog any good.
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(Granted, we need to give Socrates a little license here. If a person is just viciously cruel to a dog, I doubt the dog is going to be “friendly” towards them afterward…maybe afraid, but not friendly. The example works better if we assume the familiar is not outright cruel to the dog, but never does anything particularly kind either…they’re just sort of neutral in or minimal in their treatment of the dog.)
In any event, Glaucon acknowledges the phenomenon Socrates references…though he still confesses bewilderment as to what that has to do with finding guardians for the city.
Socrates explains that the hypothetical guard dog is a “true philosopher” as evidenced by the fact that the only distinction he makes between the familiar he is gentle with and the stranger he is aggressive toward is that the dog knows the former, and does not know the latter.
And must not the creature be fond of learning who determines what is friendly and what is unfriendly by the test of knowledge and ignorance? (p. 56)
Ummm…okay. Like Glaucon, I can acknowledge the reality of the phenomenon Socrates is referring to…but his assertion that the dog’s behavior exhibits knowing is where things break down for me. Clearly, Socrates realizes that dogs aren’t in the agora debating the nature of truth, life, etc. So basically his argument here seeks to equate a conditioned response based on familiarity with a “love of wisdom.” (Ibid.) Socrates then makes a second leap in which he just asserts we may:
…say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge? (Ibid.)
