BRICS 2026: From Economic Acronym to Global South Power Platform
The 2026 BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi was more than another diplomatic gathering of emerging economies. Beneath the formal language of declarations, trade, financial cooperation and multilateral reform was a larger story: the global system is moving from a world dominated by a relatively small group of established powers towards a more distributed, contested and networked order.
For India, this transition presents a particularly complex opportunity. New Delhi does not appear interested in simply replacing Western dominance with another bloc dominated by China or Russia. Instead, India is attempting something more difficult — maintaining strategic autonomy while simultaneously creating greater space for the Global South in global decision-making.
That distinction is important. BRICS originally emerged from an economic observation. The acronym was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to describe Brazil, Russia, India and China as major emerging economies. The first BRICS summit took place in Yekaterinburg in 2009, followed by South Africa joining in 2011. The grouping subsequently developed institutions such as the New Development Bank and expanded beyond its original four members.
By 2026, BRICS had become a substantially larger platform comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Collectively, the expanded grouping represents almost half of humanity and around 40 percent of global economic output, with an increasingly significant share of world trade.
The numbers matter — but the direction matters even more. BRICS is increasingly becoming a platform through which emerging and developing economies can question the rules, institutions and assumptions that shaped the international economic order after the Second World War. And India, as the 2026 chair, sought to give that transformation a particular character.
From a “pyramid of privilege” to a “platform of partnership”
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s messaging at the summit was carefully calibrated. One of the strongest themes was the need to move away from what he described as a “pyramid of privilege” towards a “platform of partnership.” This is more than diplomatic rhetoric.
The post-war international system created institutions that reflected the distribution of power of their time. The United Nations Security Council, IMF, World Bank and other institutions continue to operate within structures that increasingly appear disconnected from the economic weight and demographic importance of today’s emerging economies.
The world has changed faster than many of its institutions. India’s argument is therefore not simply that the West should lose influence. Rather, the emerging economies should have a greater role in determining the rules under which the global economy operates.
This explains India’s continued emphasis on reform of the United Nations, IMF and World Bank, greater representation for developing countries and reform of global economic governance. The underlying proposition is straightforward: If the centre of economic growth is changing, the architecture of economic governance must change with it. That is perhaps the most important geopolitical message emerging from India’s BRICS presidency.
BRICS is becoming an economic project — not merely a geopolitical one
There is a tendency in Western commentary to interpret BRICS primarily as an anti-Western geopolitical project. That interpretation is incomplete. India has repeatedly signalled that BRICS is not an anti-Western alliance. Instead, New Delhi appears to see the organisation as a mechanism through which emerging economies can increase their negotiating power and reduce structural vulnerabilities.
Trade was therefore central to India’s agenda. India called for more open and predictable trade practices, removal of trade barriers and deeper intra-BRICS economic cooperation. The idea of identifying and removing the top ten barriers to trade is particularly significant because it shifts the conversation from political declarations to practical economic integration.
India also presented itself as an “economic bridge.” This is a revealing choice of language. A bridge does not necessarily belong to either side of a river. Its value comes from connecting otherwise separated systems.
That reflects India’s broader foreign-policy posture: maintain relationships with the United States, Europe, Japan and other advanced economies while simultaneously strengthening economic and strategic relationships with China, Russia, the Gulf, Africa, Latin America and the wider Global South. This is not traditional non-alignment. It is closer to networked strategic autonomy.
The currency question: from dollar dependence to payment diversity
One of the most consequential long-term questions surrounding BRICS is the future of international payments. There has been considerable discussion about a possible BRICS currency. However, the more immediate development is arguably less dramatic but potentially more practical: increasing the use of national currencies, connecting payment systems and creating alternatives to excessive dependence on a single international financial infrastructure.
India has already demonstrated the possibilities through UPI. UPI’s international expansion shows how a digital public infrastructure developed primarily for India’s domestic economy can become an instrument of international economic connectivity. The larger question is what happens when such systems begin interacting with one another.
Digital currencies, central-bank digital currencies, interoperable payment networks and local-currency settlement could gradually create a more diversified international financial ecosystem. This does not necessarily mean the dollar disappears.
It means the world could become less dependent on any single currency or payment architecture. That distinction is strategically important. For India, this creates an opportunity to export not simply software and services, but digital infrastructure models.
Maritime trade: the forgotten foundation of the Global South economy
Another important dimension of India’s BRICS agenda was maritime security. Modern globalisation ultimately depends on ships. Food, energy, semiconductors, minerals, manufactured goods and industrial components move through maritime routes. Disruption to major sea lanes can therefore affect inflation, energy security, manufacturing and national security simultaneously.
India’s emphasis on freedom of navigation, secure sea lanes and the safety of seafarers reflects this reality. The proposed Seafarers Emergency Support Network is particularly interesting because it connects geopolitics with human security. Behind every shipping statistic are people. A container ship may be a symbol of global commerce, but its movement depends on thousands of seafarers working in increasingly uncertain geopolitical environments.
India is therefore attempting to widen the definition of maritime security — from naval security alone to the security of commerce and the people who enable that commerce. For an economy such as India’s, positioned at the heart of the Indian Ocean, this is strategically significant.
China: competition without permanent confrontation
Perhaps the most closely watched moment of the summit was the meeting between Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping. Xi’s visit to India was significant in itself. It was his first visit to India in seven years and came after a period of considerable tension between the two countries.
The relationship remains deeply complicated. India and China continue to have an unresolved boundary dispute. Trade remains heavily imbalanced, with India’s imports from China far exceeding its exports. At the same time, both countries understand that prolonged confrontation carries economic costs.
The emerging message from the Modi-Xi engagement was therefore not that strategic competition had disappeared. It was that competition should not automatically become conflict. The principle that differences should not become disputes — and disputes should not escalate into confrontation — offers a possible framework for managing the relationship.
This is particularly important because India and China have overlapping interests in several areas: trade, supply chains, climate negotiations, emerging technologies, energy, the Global South and reform of global institutions.
The challenge is to compartmentalise the relationship. Border security can remain sensitive while trade continues. Strategic competition can coexist with diplomatic engagement. And political differences do not necessarily require economic decoupling.
The reported engagement between Indian and Chinese military commanders regarding management of the sensitive frontier further illustrates the same logic: stabilise the border sufficiently to prevent tactical incidents from destroying the broader diplomatic relationship. This is not friendship. It is managed strategic competition.
The analytical interpretation around the Modi-Xi meeting adds another layer to the official diplomatic narrative. The important distinction is between what happened and what the meeting signals.
Officially, India and China emphasised dialogue, border stability, economic relations and the need to prevent differences from becoming disputes. Strategically, however, the meeting suggests something deeper. India cannot ignore China. China cannot ignore India.
Both are too large, too geographically connected and too economically important to each other. The relationship is therefore moving towards a more pragmatic model in which both sides attempt to manage competition rather than eliminate it.
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For India, the objective is not to become dependent on China. Nor is it to permanently confront China. The objective is to create enough stability to pursue India’s larger transformation. That distinction may ultimately prove more important than the optics of any individual summit.
The India–China–Russia geometry
The BRICS environment also highlights an emerging strategic geometry involving India, China and Russia. Calling this a formal “axis” would be premature. The three countries have very different interests, political systems and relationships with the West.
Yet there is an important convergence. Russia seeks alternatives to Western financial and economic dependence. China seeks a more multipolar international system and greater influence over global institutions. India seeks strategic autonomy, greater Global South representation and freedom from excessive dependence on any single power.
Their motivations differ. Their interests overlap. This is precisely why the geometry matters. India’s challenge is to participate in this emerging multipolarity without becoming trapped inside a China-led or Russia-led strategic architecture. That is where India’s bridge-building strategy becomes important.
Iran, critical minerals and the next economic frontier
Iran’s call for greater business within BRICS currencies reflects another important trend: the grouping is gradually moving from political symbolism towards mechanisms for practical economic resilience.
At the same time, critical minerals are becoming a strategic issue comparable to oil and gas in the twentieth century. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements, graphite and other minerals are fundamental to batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy, semiconductors, defence technologies and advanced manufacturing.
Control over these resources — and more importantly, control over their processing and supply chains — will influence the next industrial cycle. An open market for critical minerals among BRICS economies could therefore become strategically important.
The opportunity is not simply to trade minerals. It is to build integrated value chains. This is where BRICS could potentially connect with the circular economy. Instead of reproducing a resource-extraction model, emerging economies could build systems in which resources remain within productive cycles for as long as possible.
AI, quantum, biotech: BRICS enters the technology race
Perhaps the most forward-looking aspect of India’s BRICS agenda is its emphasis on emerging technologies. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, cybersecurity, semiconductors and advanced digital infrastructure are no longer simply technology-sector subjects.
They are becoming instruments of national power. India’s AI messaging is particularly significant because New Delhi has increasingly positioned AI as a global common good rather than simply a competitive advantage for technology companies.
The broader challenge is governance. Who controls AI? Who owns the data? Who determines acceptable uses? How do countries protect sovereignty while benefiting from global technology? How can developing countries avoid becoming merely consumers of AI systems designed elsewhere? These questions become even more important for BRICS because many member countries represent enormous populations but have very different levels of technological capability.
The opportunity is therefore to create technology partnerships in which advanced members contribute research and infrastructure while emerging economies contribute markets, talent, use cases and domain knowledge. India’s own strengths in digital public infrastructure, software, startups, pharmaceuticals and engineering provide an important foundation.
China contributes enormous manufacturing capability and research capacity. Russia has deep scientific and engineering expertise. Brazil brings agricultural and bioeconomy strengths. The Gulf countries bring capital and infrastructure. Other BRICS members bring energy, minerals, agriculture, demographics and strategic geography. The real opportunity lies in connecting these strengths.
Sustainability cannot remain a side agenda
Climate change creates another area where BRICS could potentially move beyond conventional geopolitical competition. The Global South is simultaneously among the most vulnerable to climate disruption and among the regions where future economic growth will occur.
That creates a difficult equation. Emerging economies need economic growth. They also need energy security. But they cannot simply reproduce the carbon-intensive development pathway followed by today’s advanced economies.
This is where sustainability, circular economy principles, clean technology and responsible resource utilisation become strategically important. A future BRICS model could potentially link climate finance, critical minerals, clean energy, circular manufacturing and technology transfer. The question is whether BRICS can move from negotiating climate responsibility to building practical climate solutions.
What does BRICS mean for the West?
For the United States, Europe and their allies, BRICS should not simply be interpreted as the birth of an opposing alliance. The more significant development is the gradual emergence of alternative centres of economic and technological influence.
The West retains enormous advantages in finance, technology, higher education, capital markets, military capability and institutional influence. But the Global South increasingly has alternatives. Markets are diversifying. Supply chains are diversifying. Payment systems are diversifying. Energy relationships are diversifying. Technology partnerships are diversifying. That does not mean the existing system collapses. It means the cost of ignoring emerging economies increases.
For Western policymakers, the strategic question may therefore become less “How do we contain BRICS?” and more “How do we remain relevant in a world where BRICS members have greater choices?”
What PM Modi was really signalling
My interpretation is that PM Modi’s BRICS message was fundamentally about strategic space. India is attempting to create room for manoeuvre. Room to trade with China while competing with China. Room to work with Russia while expanding relations with the West. Room to cooperate with the United States and Japan while strengthening the Global South. Room to use the dollar while developing alternative payment mechanisms. Room to embrace AI while demanding responsible governance. Room to pursue economic growth while addressing climate change. This is the logic of strategic autonomy in the twenty-first century. The objective is not to choose one camp. It is to make sure India has meaningful relationships with multiple camps.
Beyond BRICS: Building a better model
This is where I believe the BRICS conversation should go next. Balancing Western power is necessary in a multipolar world, but balance of power alone is not enough.
The Global South needs innovation. Not simply imitation. One useful lesson can be found in the Guangzhou model of innovation: the interaction of talent, capital, universities, research, manufacturing, infrastructure, government support, markets and entrepreneurial risk-taking. The lesson is not to copy Guangzhou. The lesson is to understand the mechanism.
Every BRICS member has something different to contribute to such a system. Brazil has enormous capabilities in agriculture and bioeconomy. China has extraordinary manufacturing and technology ecosystems. India has digital infrastructure, software, pharmaceuticals, engineering talent and a large entrepreneurial ecosystem. Russia has scientific and engineering capabilities. The Gulf states bring capital, energy and infrastructure. Africa brings demographic potential, resources and emerging markets.
The opportunity is to bring these strengths together without requiring every country to become identical. But there is another ingredient that is often missing from geopolitical discussions: integrity.
An Integrity Charter for the Global South
If BRICS wants to become a model for the future rather than simply another geopolitical bloc, it should consider an Integrity Charter. Such a framework could cover responsible investment, transparency, anti-corruption, environmental accountability, scientific integrity, responsible AI, data responsibility, fair treatment of workers and communities, and responsible use of natural resources.
Because technological capability without ethical capability can become dangerous. Economic growth without sustainability becomes fragile. AI without human responsibility becomes unpredictable. And geopolitical power without trust eventually creates resistance. BRICS therefore has an unusual opportunity.
It could attempt to build not merely another institution for negotiating power, but a laboratory for experimenting with new models of international cooperation.
The real opportunity
The world does not necessarily need another bloc. It needs another model. A model in which every country brings its strengths to the table — but also brings responsibility. A model where innovation is not concentrated in a handful of technology centres. A model where emerging economies are not merely consumers of technology created elsewhere. A model where AI is powerful but accountable.
Where economic growth is compatible with sustainability. Where critical resources are developed without destroying communities. Where technology strengthens human capability rather than reducing human dignity. And where geopolitical competition does not prevent cooperation on problems that threaten everyone. That, ultimately, may be the bigger significance of BRICS 2026. India is not simply asking for a larger seat at the existing table. It appears to be asking whether the table itself can be redesigned.
