The Euthyphro Dilemma: A Third Idea
The two sides to the Euthyphro Dilemma:
- Divine Command Theory: An action is wrong because God commands it — morality is based solely on God’s will
- Guided Will Theory: God forbids an action because it is wrong — there is a pre-existing standard of morality which is independent of God’s will.
This dilemma, in its organic form, is a two-sided dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro, which of course has been applied to other ideologies and philosophical concepts. Mark Taylor, in his essay “The Euthyphro Dilemma and Utilitarianism” connects the raised concepts, how one can be applied to another and how the former can disprove a successful ‘Utility Principle’ which Taylor describes, if perfectly enacted, as:
“…an agent [who] achieves moral rightness in any particular case if and only if he promotes the happiest possible outcome that agent could have produced.”
However, the discussion of the Euthyphro Dilemma has been consistently binary since its birth, subsequently confining us to two extremist stances, both of which may very well stand incorrect.
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This third idea posits itself as a subsidiary of the Guided Will Theory (GWT); in that one must lean toward the former to believe the prospective. If you subscribe to GWT, it is required that you believe in an objective, pre-existing foundation of morality — a foundation of principle which transcends God’s directive. It is not required that you believe in the Judeo-Christian concept of God, or rather, you should not — this idea is best presented alongside agnostic theism. The third dilemma will be presented in context to this as follows.
Because there is a pre-existing ordinance of “Good” and “Bad”, every human action has been separated into two groups; there are no exceptions and no neutralities. For the purpose of this idea, we will not call them “Good” and “Bad” but “Group A” and “Group B”. Group A contains generosity, altruism, humility, and all of these seemingly positive traits as exploitations. Group B contains mortality, murder, (pre-marital) sex/lust, vices, and alternatively, all of these traits as merits. It is difficult to approach either of these groups as anything different than how they afford themselves — this is our limited perception (though out of our hands) in reflection. We might subconsciously view Group A as a docile creature and Group B as a rabid, untamable beast but one must consider a world wherein the roles were reversed. We exist now, in “A World” being that we see altruism as a positive trait, and of course we would, because this course of thought has been selected for us. However, in “B World” altruism may alternatively be seen as a propensity to idol worship or general weak-will. We can plausibly bridge the connection to this world by inclining to its subtle absurdity. I present homicide, a virtue, as seen in “B World” — something which may not be termed “moral” but is at least seen as less immoral than in “A World”.
This being established, and assuming we are without the human nature we are currently bound to, these groups are balanced in rightfulness and wrongfulness. Each contains their respective virtues and respective iniquities, which, viewed from a neutral standpoint, or from a point pre-dating their divine selection, would be equal in the eyes of whatever created them (a being which is separate from God). The idea is not that we conform to a new set of rules as they are presented but that these rules are pre-existing and inextricable with our universe — we cannot conceive an alternative notion within our world.
It only follows that God does not decide what is good and bad, but which commingled group of good and bad is “better” and which is “worse” in consequentialist terms. It can be debated whether the chosen set of moralities are Utilitarian and if God has access to that objectivity. In any case, this is how our sense of morality is established. This is why we can find shame in moral action and, in concert, rationalize immoral action. It also presents as a viable explanation for apprehension toward religious morality and the desire to seek out the grounds for an objective one. Perhaps it is a rudimentary nature which drives us to certain “immoralities” and not others. Perhaps the moral blueprint which we follow now was decided by a celestial gamble.
