Chicago Fire II vs Forward Madison: A Tactical Analysis
Wednesday night saw the Chicago Fire II come out victorious with a 2–0 over USL League One side, Forward Madison in the second round of the 2024 Lamar Hunt U.S. Open Cup. The fixture took place at a cold, rainy, and sometimes even snowy SeatGeek Stadium.
David Poreba would strike first for the Fire II in the 11th minute after the Madison keeper Martin Sanchez failed to hold a cross put in by Omari Glasgow which fell perfectly to the feet of the midfielder allowing him to put away the simple tap-in. The Fire II wouldn’t strike again until the 90th minute via a first-ever professional goal from striker, Jason Shokalook which would secure the side’s advancement into the third round of the competition.
In this article, I break down the tactical setup of Ludovic Taillandier’s, Fire II side that led them to victory and a place in the third round.
Out of Possession
For me, it was the Fire II’s play out of possession that helped lead them to victory over Madison and put them into the third round of the cup. Out of possession, Ludovic Taillandier’s side showed a lot of tactical flexibility and versatility. So far over 2024, Taillandier’s aims off the ball have been clear. Out of possession, Taillandier wants his side to press the opposition high up the pitch and give them discomfort when building from the back. Yesterday this was clear, early on in the match Madison looked to build from the back. This buildout was met with a high Fire press when Madison was in their first phase of build-up. When Madison was in possession in their first quarter of the pitch they were met with a 4–1–3–2 from the Fire II. In possession of the ball in the first phase of their buildup, Madison built out with a three-back. Often one of their center backs would push slightly farther up the pitch and the remaining two would split to each side of keeper Martin Sanchez. Harold Osario and Cristian Koffi were tasked with going man-to-man with both of the center backs. This essentially took them out of the build-up and forced Madison to look to go long. More often than not the ball was then turned over and the Fire II would look to quickly counter. The best example of this comes in the 24th minute where a Fire press led to a Madison turnover and then a quick counter with Harold Osario hitting the woodwork.
If Forward Madison were able to beat the press, which they were able to do several times, the Fire II would fall into a mid-block and switch their shape into a 5–4–1. This to me is where the game was won for one reason in particular. That reason was that it invited more Madison players forward to join their attack thus leaving them vulnerable on the counterattack. Another reason is that it made it very difficult for Madison to break down the Fire II and that is reflected in the statistics of the match. Over the course of the 90 minutes Madison did not record one shot on target. This is due to the number of Fire players behind the ball. Most interestingly Omari Glasgow would play as a wingback out of possession. When the Fire II lost the ball Glasgow would play next to Poreba in the midfield during their press. If this press was beaten Glasgow would then drop to play next to Shannon when they fell into their mid-block.
In Transition
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The Fire II’s play in transition play was mentioned briefly above but I’ll touch on it again. When the Fire II won possession of the ball back, whether it was high up the pitch or from a deeper area in their own half they looked to hit Madison on the counter. Omari Glasgow was a crucial part of this. If possession was won back he would immediately leave his right back duties and take up a possession higher up the pitch as the Fire transitioned and looked to counter, this gave them two things. Firstly, it gave them an outlet to hit high up and additionally, it gave them added number forward.
The Fire II’s play in transition is what earned them their second goal as well as placement into the next round. As the game progressed and Madison became more and more desperate for an equalizer they began committing more players higher up the pitch. In the 90th minute a loose pass from a Forward Madison player in the midfield turned possession over straight to Lamonth Rochester, Rochester wasted no time and played a ball over the Madison backline where Jason Shokolook got on the end of it and fired the Fire II 2–0 up.
In Possession
In possession, the Fire II were a little hard to analyze, especially in the first half due to the match being so cagey. Throughout the entire game, the Fire II shape in possession remained the same. The shape the Fire II used in possession was primarily a 3–4–3. However, a 3–3–4 was also used occasionally but I’ll touch on that later. Once the ball was won back the Fire would switch to three in the back. In the three Fire II matches prior to this one they have opted to have their center backs split to each side of Patrick Los and typically it has been Los leading the buildup with both fullbacks taking more advanced positions. That was not the case against Madison. Against Madison, Taillandier opted to build up with three center backs with Diego Konnicks, an excellent ball-playing center back to lead the buildout. First-teamer Wyatt Omsberg would stretch to the left of Konnicks and Jaylen Shannon to the right. Fullback Lamonth Rochester was used brilliantly in my eyes. When the Fire got on the ball he would join and occupy a spot in the midfield. This gave the Fire an outlet when they were pressed by Madison, also a team who has shown they like to press high in 2024.
In the midfield, the Fire II opted to play with a diamond midfield. David Poreba would occupy the #10, Casas Jr. played as the #6, and Rochester and Oregel played as the two #8’s. There were some instances where Oregel Jr. would push up the pitch as play as a winger but when this happened Omari Glasgow would fill in for him at the #8.
As mentioned above there were some instances where instead of using a 3–4–3 shape in possession the shape would switch to a 3–3–4. When this would both Poreba and Koffi would play through the middle as the two #9’s. Oregel Jr and Rochester would then act as two #10’s in behind them. This shape was rarely used but would happen when Poreba would push forward, which is a common trend of Poreba.
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