Releases: loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
Release list
v0.11.3
tpm-ca-certificates v0.11.3
What's Changed
This release bump indirect dependencies after the discovery of vulnerabilities.
The following changes have been made:
- sigstore/timestamp-authority:
- Change: bump from v2.0.4 to v2.1.0
- CVE: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-5763
- in-toto-golang:
- Change: bump from v0.9.0 to v0.11.0
- CVE: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-5547
This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit b751dc948ea3f6cc0e7b3285aa3dc1232b7a7f18.
Artifacts
tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION- CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json- SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX formatchecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksums of all artifactschecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
OCI Images
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.3
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latestVerification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI
For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.11.3' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.11.3_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates2. OCI Provenance
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.3 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesChangelog
- b60a952: secu(deps): bump in-toto-golang to 0.11.0 (#192) (@loicsikidi)
- b751dc9: secu(deps): bump timestamp-autority and rekor (#193) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
2026-06-10
TPM CA Certificates 2026-06-10
What's Changed
| Certificate | Type | Vendor | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| EK/AK CA Intermediate (2024) | Intermediate | GOOG | ADD |
| EK/AK CA Intermediate (2026) | Intermediate | GOOG | ADD |
| EK/AK CA Intermediate | Intermediate | GOOG | REMOVE |
Note
EK/AK CA Intermediate has been renamed to EK/AK CA Intermediate (2024).
This release contains the TPM CA Certificates generated at commit 491073f0822de07bcd62a3850111861e2f3ee188.
Artifacts
tpm-ca-certificates.pem- The TPM trust bundletpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem- The TPM intermediate trust bundlechecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksumchecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
Verification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
Option 1: tpmtb CLI
Note
The following commands verify the integrity and provenance of each bundle artifact.
tpmtb is able to verify Github attestation signatures and Cosign keyless signatures natively (no need to install Cosign or gh).
Tip
Make sure to use tpmtb >= v0.11.2.
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediateOption 2: Cosign and GitHub CLI
The following process does the same thing as option 1:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release-bundle.yaml@refs/tags/2026-06-10' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify the bundle matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
gh attestation verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
gh attestation verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesOption 3: Reproducibility
Warning
This method only verifies the integrity of each bundle.
To be fully secure it MUST be used in addition with gh attestation verify to validate provenance.
git clone https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
cd tpm-ca-certificates
git checkout 2026-06-10
go run ./ bundle generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-roots.yaml --output tpm-ca-certificates.pem
go run ./ bundle generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-intermediates.yaml --output tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate
sha256sum tpm-ca-certificates.pem tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem # Compare with checksums.txtChangelog
- a5ed551: rot(GOOG): add new intermediate cert (#188) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
v0.11.2
tpm-ca-certificates v0.11.2
What's Changed
This release fix a regression that occurred after immutable release activation which broke verification step (i.e., provenance check). See #182 for more detail.
This regression only impact 2026-05-24 bundle.
This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 39f742e14a824c29d5a4b1549cdbbc537456ee3e.
Artifacts
tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION- CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json- SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX formatchecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksums of all artifactschecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
OCI Images
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.2
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latestVerification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI
For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.11.2' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.11.2_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates2. OCI Provenance
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.2 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesChangelog
- 39f742e: fix(api): select provenance attestation #182 (#183) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
2026-05-24
TPM CA Certificates 2026-05-24
What's Changed
| Certificate | Type | Vendor | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| EK/AK CA Intermediate | Intermediate | GOOG | ADD |
| EK/AK CA Root | Root | GOOG | ADD |
| Nations TPM ECC EK CA 001 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM ECC EK CA 002 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM ECC EK CA 003 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM ECC EK CA 004 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM ECC EK CA 005 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM RSA EK CA 001 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM RSA EK CA 002 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM RSA EK CA 003 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM RSA EK CA 004 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM RSA EK CA 005 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM ECC ROOT CA 001 | Root | NTZ | ADD |
| Nations TPM RSA ROOT CA 001 | Root | NTZ | ADD |
This release contains the TPM CA Certificates generated at commit 3b6110aa4b2009a67ea32916897b0255001f340a.
Artifacts
tpm-ca-certificates.pem- The TPM trust bundletpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem- The TPM intermediate trust bundlechecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksumchecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
Verification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
Option 1: tpmtb CLI
Note
The following commands verify the integrity and provenance of each bundle artifact.
tpmtb is able to verify Github attestation signatures and Cosign keyless signatures natively (no need to install Cosign or gh).
Tip
Make sure to use tpmtb >= v0.11.2.
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediateOption 2: Cosign and GitHub CLI
The following process does the same thing as option 1:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release-bundle.yaml@refs/tags/2026-05-24' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify the bundle matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
gh attestation verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
gh attestation verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesOption 3: Reproducibility
Warning
This method only verifies the integrity of each bundle.
To be fully secure it MUST be used in addition with gh attestation verify to validate provenance.
git clone https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
cd tpm-ca-certificates
git checkout 2026-05-24
go run ./ bundle generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-roots.yaml --output tpm-ca-certificates.pem
go run ./ bundle generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-intermediates.yaml --output tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate
sha256sum tpm-ca-certificates.pem tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem # Compare with checksums.txtChangelog
- 3b6110a: rot(GOOG): add support to GCP #111 (#181) (@loicsikidi)
- 01dc641: rot(NTZ): add 2 roots and 10 intermediates (#180) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
v0.11.1
tpm-ca-certificates v0.11.1
What's Changed
This release just include some internal refactoring. The main change is the migration to optional config in apiv1beta (i.e., GetTrustedBundle, VerifyTrustedBundle and SaveTrustedBundle) (see #176 for more detail).
This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 9f60dd1072935f3daad77d520a46cdb6835bbd66.
Artifacts
tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION- CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json- SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX formatchecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksums of all artifactschecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
OCI Images
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.1
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latestVerification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI
For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.11.1' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.11.1_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates2. OCI Provenance
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.1 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesChangelog
- d7f971e: chore(test): remove nit code (#175) (@loicsikidi)
- 9f60dd1: refactor(api): migrate to optional config (#176) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
2026-05-19
TPM CA Certificates 2026-05-19
What's Changed
| Certificate | Type | Vendor | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| AMDTPM ECC | Root | AMD | ADD (reintroduction see #125) |
| AMDTPM RSA | Root | AMD | ADD (reintroduction see #128) |
| ODCA 2 CSME P_ADL 00002820 | Intermediate | INTC | ADD |
| Nationz TPM Manufacturing CA 001 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nationz TPM Manufacturing CA 002 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nationz TPM Manufacturing CA 003 | Intermediate | NTZ | ADD |
| Nationz TPM Root CA | Root | NTZ | ADD |
This release contains the TPM CA Certificates generated at commit 2d920a65796dc4469551c5a236bcef413ba179e2.
Artifacts
tpm-ca-certificates.pem- The TPM trust bundletpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem- The TPM intermediate trust bundlechecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksumchecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
Verification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
Option 1: tpmtb CLI
Note
The following commands verify the integrity and provenance of each bundle artifact.
tpmtb is able to verify Github attestation signatures and Cosign keyless signatures natively (no need to install Cosign or gh).
Tip
Make sure to use tpmtb >= v0.5.0 to support intermediate bundle verification.
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediateOption 2: Cosign and GitHub CLI
The following process does the same thing as option 1:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release-bundle.yaml@refs/tags/2026-05-19' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify the bundle matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
gh attestation verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
gh attestation verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesOption 3: Reproducibility
Warning
This method only verifies the integrity of each bundle.
To be fully secure it MUST be used in addition with gh attestation verify to validate provenance.
git clone https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
cd tpm-ca-certificates
git checkout 2026-05-19
go run ./ generate --workers 10 --output tpm-ca-certificates.pem
go run ./ generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-intermediates.yaml --output tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate
sha256sum tpm-ca-certificates.pem # Compare with checksums.txtChangelog
- 5b98052: rot: reimport AMDTPM RSA #128 (#156) (@loicsikidi)
- 399129c: rot: reimport AMDTPM ECC #125 (#155) (@loicsikidi)
- 604c3bc: rot(INTC): add "ODCA 2 CSME P_ADL 00002820" subca (#161) (@loicsikidi)
- affbdd4: rot: add NTZ vendor (#163) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
v0.11.0
tpm-ca-certificates v0.11.0
What's Changed
This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 76c500b5c8f64c26b1278d79cc23110ebad04ad9.
Artifacts
tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION- CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json- SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX formatchecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksums of all artifactschecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
OCI Images
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.0
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latestVerification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI
For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.11.0' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.11.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates2. OCI Provenance
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.0 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesChangelog
tpmtb config *now supportsallowHttpFallbackfield
Commits
- 634840a: feat(config): add AllowHttpFallback to Certificate (#165) (@loicsikidi)
- d1a5549: fix: some minors fixes (#162) (@loicsikidi)
- 76c500b: test(resolver): add allowHttpFallback test case (#166) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
v0.10.0
tpm-ca-certificates v0.10.0
What's Changed
This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 400274df7d8924cb3d287977b292c0904f109c71.
Artifacts
tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION- CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json- SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX formatchecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksums of all artifactschecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
OCI Images
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.10.0
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latestVerification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI
For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.10.0' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.10.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates2. OCI Provenance
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.10.0 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesChangelog
- CLI supports config's
betaformat
Commits
- 5b98052: rot: reimport AMDTPM RSA #128 (#156) (@loicsikidi)
- 58a41ed: feat: add support to URI in 'certificates add' cmd (#157) (@loicsikidi)
- 89e089e: feat: introduce URI in config #126 (#151) (@loicsikidi)
- b6e71f8: fix: forget to migrate placeholder in config.go (#152) (@loicsikidi)
- 5866d9f: fix: regression in config format with file URI (#154) (@loicsikidi)
- 400274d: fix: reword URL to Source in 'certificates list' (#158) (@loicsikidi)
- 87eb1d2: fix: support URI in yaml validator (#153) (@loicsikidi)
- 57b84e6: refactor(cli): add Check method in Opts (#150) (@loicsikidi)
- 23d83f8: refactor: migrate to go-utils (#149) (@loicsikidi)
- 399129c: rot: reimport AMDTPM ECC #125 (#155) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
v0.9.0
tpm-ca-certificates v0.9.0
What's Changed
This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 366e970a144e48057e56a833e2aa846c8d25676b.
Artifacts
tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION- CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json- SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX formatchecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksums of all artifactschecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
OCI Images
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.9.0
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latestVerification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI
For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.9.0' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.9.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates2. OCI Provenance
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.9.0 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesChangelog
- d68d400: ci: remove test exception (#143) (@loicsikidi)
- 330a424: feat(api): add FindFunc to TrustBundle interface (#142) (@loicsikidi)
- 366e970: fix(api): harmonize Persist signature (#147) (@loicsikidi)
- 0f375e0: refactor(api): move config structs in a config.go (#137) (@loicsikidi)
- 5545a84: refactor(api): rename some functions (#138) (@loicsikidi)
- 750e48a: refactor: improve TrustBundle interface (#139) (@loicsikidi)
- 1f39187: refactor: use ekca pkg in Test(Contains|Verify) (#140) (@loicsikidi)
Generated with GoReleaser 🚀
v0.8.0
tpm-ca-certificates v0.8.0
What's Changed
This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 4575b2b97cfd7cd553c12788991a674e642e207d.
Artifacts
tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION- CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json- SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX formatchecksums.txt- SHA-256 checksums of all artifactschecksums.txt.sigstore.json- Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification
OCI Images
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.8.0
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latestVerification
Important
If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:
1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI
For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:
Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign
First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:
Tip
Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.
# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.8.0' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txtStep 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI
Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:
# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.8.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates2. OCI Provenance
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.8.0 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificatesChangelog
CLI
- NEW
- Support
descriptionfield in bundle config #131
- Support
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