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Releases: loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

v0.11.3

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@github-actions github-actions released this 26 Jul 07:29
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
b751dc9

tpm-ca-certificates v0.11.3

What's Changed

This release bump indirect dependencies after the discovery of vulnerabilities.

The following changes have been made:


This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit b751dc948ea3f6cc0e7b3285aa3dc1232b7a7f18.

Artifacts

  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION - CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)
  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json - SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX format
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksums of all artifacts
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

OCI Images

docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.3
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latest

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI

For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.11.3' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.11.3_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

2. OCI Provenance

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.3 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Changelog

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2026-06-10

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@github-actions github-actions released this 10 Jun 21:46
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
491073f

TPM CA Certificates 2026-06-10

What's Changed

Certificate Type Vendor Action
EK/AK CA Intermediate (2024) Intermediate GOOG ADD
EK/AK CA Intermediate (2026) Intermediate GOOG ADD
EK/AK CA Intermediate Intermediate GOOG REMOVE

Note

EK/AK CA Intermediate has been renamed to EK/AK CA Intermediate (2024).


This release contains the TPM CA Certificates generated at commit 491073f0822de07bcd62a3850111861e2f3ee188.

Artifacts

  • tpm-ca-certificates.pem - The TPM trust bundle
  • tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem - The TPM intermediate trust bundle
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksum
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

Option 1: tpmtb CLI

Note

The following commands verify the integrity and provenance of each bundle artifact.

tpmtb is able to verify Github attestation signatures and Cosign keyless signatures natively (no need to install Cosign or gh).

Tip

Make sure to use tpmtb >= v0.11.2.

tpmtb bundle verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate

Option 2: Cosign and GitHub CLI

The following process does the same thing as option 1:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release-bundle.yaml@refs/tags/2026-06-10' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify the bundle matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

gh attestation verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
gh attestation verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Option 3: Reproducibility

Warning

This method only verifies the integrity of each bundle.
To be fully secure it MUST be used in addition with gh attestation verify to validate provenance.

git clone https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
cd tpm-ca-certificates
git checkout 2026-06-10
go run ./ bundle generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-roots.yaml --output tpm-ca-certificates.pem
go run ./ bundle generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-intermediates.yaml --output tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate
sha256sum tpm-ca-certificates.pem tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem # Compare with checksums.txt

Changelog

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v0.11.2

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@github-actions github-actions released this 25 May 06:06
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
39f742e

tpm-ca-certificates v0.11.2

What's Changed

This release fix a regression that occurred after immutable release activation which broke verification step (i.e., provenance check). See #182 for more detail.

This regression only impact 2026-05-24 bundle.


This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 39f742e14a824c29d5a4b1549cdbbc537456ee3e.

Artifacts

  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION - CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)
  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json - SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX format
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksums of all artifacts
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

OCI Images

docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.2
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latest

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI

For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.11.2' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.11.2_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

2. OCI Provenance

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.2 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Changelog

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2026-05-24

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@github-actions github-actions released this 24 May 22:30
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
3b6110a

TPM CA Certificates 2026-05-24

What's Changed

Certificate Type Vendor Action
EK/AK CA Intermediate Intermediate GOOG ADD
EK/AK CA Root Root GOOG ADD
Nations TPM ECC EK CA 001 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM ECC EK CA 002 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM ECC EK CA 003 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM ECC EK CA 004 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM ECC EK CA 005 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM RSA EK CA 001 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM RSA EK CA 002 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM RSA EK CA 003 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM RSA EK CA 004 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM RSA EK CA 005 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nations TPM ECC ROOT CA 001 Root NTZ ADD
Nations TPM RSA ROOT CA 001 Root NTZ ADD

This release contains the TPM CA Certificates generated at commit 3b6110aa4b2009a67ea32916897b0255001f340a.

Artifacts

  • tpm-ca-certificates.pem - The TPM trust bundle
  • tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem - The TPM intermediate trust bundle
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksum
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

Option 1: tpmtb CLI

Note

The following commands verify the integrity and provenance of each bundle artifact.

tpmtb is able to verify Github attestation signatures and Cosign keyless signatures natively (no need to install Cosign or gh).

Tip

Make sure to use tpmtb >= v0.11.2.

tpmtb bundle verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate

Option 2: Cosign and GitHub CLI

The following process does the same thing as option 1:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release-bundle.yaml@refs/tags/2026-05-24' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify the bundle matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

gh attestation verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
gh attestation verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Option 3: Reproducibility

Warning

This method only verifies the integrity of each bundle.
To be fully secure it MUST be used in addition with gh attestation verify to validate provenance.

git clone https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
cd tpm-ca-certificates
git checkout 2026-05-24
go run ./ bundle generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-roots.yaml --output tpm-ca-certificates.pem
go run ./ bundle generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-intermediates.yaml --output tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate
sha256sum tpm-ca-certificates.pem tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem # Compare with checksums.txt

Changelog

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v0.11.1

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@github-actions github-actions released this 25 May 05:59
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
9f60dd1

tpm-ca-certificates v0.11.1

What's Changed

This release just include some internal refactoring. The main change is the migration to optional config in apiv1beta (i.e., GetTrustedBundle, VerifyTrustedBundle and SaveTrustedBundle) (see #176 for more detail).


This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 9f60dd1072935f3daad77d520a46cdb6835bbd66.

Artifacts

  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION - CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)
  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json - SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX format
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksums of all artifacts
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

OCI Images

docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.1
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latest

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI

For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.11.1' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.11.1_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

2. OCI Provenance

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.1 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Changelog

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2026-05-19

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@github-actions github-actions released this 19 May 12:01
2d920a6

TPM CA Certificates 2026-05-19

What's Changed

Certificate Type Vendor Action
AMDTPM ECC Root AMD ADD (reintroduction see #125)
AMDTPM RSA Root AMD ADD (reintroduction see #128)
ODCA 2 CSME P_ADL 00002820 Intermediate INTC ADD
Nationz TPM Manufacturing CA 001 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nationz TPM Manufacturing CA 002 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nationz TPM Manufacturing CA 003 Intermediate NTZ ADD
Nationz TPM Root CA Root NTZ ADD

This release contains the TPM CA Certificates generated at commit 2d920a65796dc4469551c5a236bcef413ba179e2.

Artifacts

  • tpm-ca-certificates.pem - The TPM trust bundle
  • tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem - The TPM intermediate trust bundle
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksum
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

Option 1: tpmtb CLI

Note

The following commands verify the integrity and provenance of each bundle artifact.

tpmtb is able to verify Github attestation signatures and Cosign keyless signatures natively (no need to install Cosign or gh).

Tip

Make sure to use tpmtb >= v0.5.0 to support intermediate bundle verification.

tpmtb bundle verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem
tpmtb bundle verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate

Option 2: Cosign and GitHub CLI

The following process does the same thing as option 1:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release-bundle.yaml@refs/tags/2026-05-19' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify the bundle matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

gh attestation verify tpm-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
gh attestation verify tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Option 3: Reproducibility

Warning

This method only verifies the integrity of each bundle.
To be fully secure it MUST be used in addition with gh attestation verify to validate provenance.

git clone https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates
cd tpm-ca-certificates
git checkout 2026-05-19
go run ./ generate --workers 10 --output tpm-ca-certificates.pem
go run ./ generate --workers 10 --config .tpm-intermediates.yaml --output tpm-intermediate-ca-certificates.pem --type intermediate
sha256sum tpm-ca-certificates.pem  # Compare with checksums.txt

Changelog

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v0.11.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 17 May 12:49
76c500b

tpm-ca-certificates v0.11.0

What's Changed

This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 76c500b5c8f64c26b1278d79cc23110ebad04ad9.

Artifacts

  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION - CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)
  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json - SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX format
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksums of all artifacts
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

OCI Images

docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.0
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latest

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI

For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.11.0' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.11.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

2. OCI Provenance

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.11.0 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Changelog

  • tpmtb config * now supports allowHttpFallback field

Commits

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v0.10.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 12 May 23:48
400274d

tpm-ca-certificates v0.10.0

What's Changed

This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 400274df7d8924cb3d287977b292c0904f109c71.

Artifacts

  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION - CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)
  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json - SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX format
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksums of all artifacts
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

OCI Images

docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.10.0
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latest

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI

For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.10.0' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.10.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

2. OCI Provenance

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.10.0 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Changelog

  • CLI supports config's beta format
    • beta format allow to define a local file (see #125 #128 for details)

Commits

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v0.9.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 04 May 22:11
366e970

tpm-ca-certificates v0.9.0

What's Changed

This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 366e970a144e48057e56a833e2aa846c8d25676b.

Artifacts

  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION - CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)
  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json - SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX format
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksums of all artifacts
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

OCI Images

docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.9.0
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latest

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI

For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.9.0' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.9.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

2. OCI Provenance

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.9.0 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Changelog

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v0.8.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 11 Apr 13:06
4575b2b

tpm-ca-certificates v0.8.0

What's Changed

This release contains the tpmtb binary and OCI images built from commit 4575b2b97cfd7cd553c12788991a674e642e207d.

Artifacts

  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION - CLI binaries for various platforms (stored in archives)
  • tpmtb_$VERSION_$OS_$ARCH.$EXTENSION.sbom.json - SBOMs for the binaries in SPDX format
  • checksums.txt - SHA-256 checksums of all artifacts
  • checksums.txt.sigstore.json - Sigstore signature bundle for checksum verification

OCI Images

docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.8.0
docker pull ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:latest

Verification

Important

If you are not familiar with the concepts around software supply chain security,
(eg. build provenance attestation, keyless signature, etc.), please read the following resources first:

1. Artefacts with Cosign and GitHub CLI

For complete security verification, follow this two-step process:

Step 1: Verify Integrity with Cosign

First, verify the integrity of the checksums file using Cosign:

Tip

Make sure to use cosign >= v2.4.3 to support the Sigstore bundle format.

# Verify the checksums signature
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.8.0' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt

# Verify any artifact matches the checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

Step 2: Verify Provenance with GitHub CLI

Once the checksum integrity is established, verify the provenance using GitHub's attestation system:

# Verify the archive
gh attestation verify tpmtb_0.8.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

2. OCI Provenance

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates/tpmtb:v0.8.0 --repo loicsikidi/tpm-ca-certificates

Changelog

CLI

  • NEW
    • Support description field in bundle config #131

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