How Effective is Peter Singer’s Effective Altruism?
Questioning the Hidden Political and Empirical Assumptions
Marx famously wrote that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it”. Singer is exemplary in this regard: as a philosopher he helped to change the world through his famous work in animal ethics. I respect him for that.
Since more than a decade, however, Singer does not talk about animals but is under the spell of effective altruism. From his 2013 TED talk to recent interviews and social media posts, he defends the idea that we should do as much good as possible by giving as much as we can to charities, so that money flows to address problems such as poverty and health, saving lives and reducing suffering where and when possible.
The underlying argument, Singer explains in a recent Facebook post, is as follows:
“Most of us would stop to help a child in immediate danger. If we can prevent equally serious suffering far away, at relatively little cost to ourselves, why should distance make a moral difference?”
In other words, it’s the Good Samaritan all over again, but more universal (not just giving to one single person), more organised, and with a lot of dollars.
Indeed, according to effective altruism, it’s perfectly fine, even preferable, if you get filthy rich. Then you can give more and hence do more good. A message that is likely to fall on receptive ears of billionaires, including those that fund American elite universities. But for the rest of us, especially the people in the U.S., the ethical theory has also wider appeal as a kind of secular version of the Protestant work ethic: no luxury allowed, everything you don’t need can go to charity; work for the good (and on the way signal that you are doing good). Modern Samaritans post about it on social media.
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So what’s the problem? Well, for a start: Singer’s view, and effective altruism more generally, is based on utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory stating that the most moral action is the one that produces the greatest good for the greatest number. It judges the rightness of an act based entirely on its outcomes and consequences, aiming to maximise overall happiness and reduce pain and (other forms of) suffering.
Utilitarianism, like all normative ethical theories, sounds good at first sight but is highly contested in philosophy and rife with problems. For example, not everyone agrees that you should help a stranger as much as, say, your partner or children. Prioritising the greater good may imply sacrificing individuals and their rights. (For example, critics have objected to effective altruist William MacAskill, who seems to prioritise doing good for hypothetical numerous future entities at the expense of currently living human beings, who are smaller in number). And the theory also seems to place a very high, perhaps too high moral demand on people. We should give up a lot, maybe even our personal projects, if we can save one life somewhere in the world. We risk to become mere instruments for maximizing overall utility, as Bernhard Williams argued.
Not all objections may be as strong as they seem (for a critical discussion of objections see for example Jeff McMahan’s paper). But both effective altruism and utilitarianism are highly controversial, philosophically speaking, and should not be taken for granted.
However, let’s assume for the sake of argument that effective altruism gets it right, then it’s an empirical question how one can maximise doing good. Are we sure that charity, in the form proposed by Singer, is the best way to reach this goal? Singer seems to assume the American political economic model: first let people make as much money as possible, so that then they can donate to charity. This is nice and friendly to capitalism and libertarian individualism, which is a political and strategic benefit in the American context. But what if another model is better at reaching the goal? For example the European one (via taxes and distribution in the welfare state plus giving state aid to poor countries) or the Chinese one? Or perhaps global governance is even more effective. In these cases doing good is compulsory (taxes) and centrally organised and often in cooperation with local governments, which might result in more good overall.
To what extent is the charity-oriented, American way of thinking about this a necessary part of effective altruism theory? Would other, less individualist and less capitalist versions be allowed, with different political assumptions? And, ultimately: Are effective altruists asking the right questions in the first place? As Pooneh Kordi puts it in her endorsement of my recent comment on Singer:
“there is a real danger that what presents itself as a universal moral theory quietly carries with it a very particular political and economic picture of the world. Perhaps the deeper question for effective altruism is not only, “How should I use my money to do the most good?” but also, “What kind of social and political world would make private charity less necessary in the first place?”
This gets us back to criticisms of utilitarianism. While utilitarianism appeals to some respectable moral intuitions about universality and impartiality and — in Singer’s case — has had a good effect on the world in so far as it has helped to reduce animal suffering, we might need another approach altogether to solve the problems of the world. A rights based approach, a liberal theory of justice, or a more radical critique of capitalism and individualist culture. Mathew Snow, for example, has argued against Singer’s charity-oriented view that “rather than creating an individualised ‘culture of giving,’ we should be challenging capitalism’s institutionalised taking.” Making the world a better place must not depend on individual goodwill alone.
Yet even if we’d want to stay within effective altruism (and within utilitarianism), my objection puts pressure on Singer’s empirical assumptions. It’s not clear why private giving to charities is necessarily the most effective way to do good (in the effective altruist’s sense). In some cases, it might be even counter-productive. McMahan has pointed out that economists have shown that philanthropic efforts may undermine potentially more effective activities of states and may enable local dictators to use the money for weapons and sustain practices that keep people in poverty. Charity may thus ultimately prevent the social and political change needed for bringing about the greater good.
While Singer might want to hold on to his utilitarianism, the empirical question regarding effectiveness cannot and must not be ignored.
